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This paper is intended to show that, at least in a considerably wide class of cases, 
indicative conditionals are adequately formalized as strict conditionals. The first 
part of the paper outlines three arguments that support the strict conditional view, 
that is, three reasons for thinking that an indicative conditional is true just in case 
it is impossible that its antecedent is true and its consequent is false. The second 
part of  the paper develops the strict conditional view and defends it from some 
foreseeable objections.  
 






1. Preliminary Clarifications  
Let us assume that > stands for ‘if  then’ as used in indicative sentences, and that 
1 and 0 designate truth and falsity. According to the strict conditional view, the 
truth conditions of  p > q are defined relative to a possible world w as follows:  
Definition 1:  [p > q] = 1 in w if and only if, for every w′, either [p] = 0 in w′ or 
[q] = 1 in w′.  
As is natural to expect, the set of  possible worlds over which ‘every’ ranges may 
vary from context to context, just as in any other quantified sentence. To say that 
p > q is true simpliciter is to say that p > q is true in the actual world. 
As the initial assumption about > implies, this paper focuses on indicative 
conditionals. From now on we will take for granted that ‘conditional’ abbrevi-
ates ‘indicative conditional’. This is not to suggest that the case of  counterfactu-
als is essentially different. On the contrary, most of  what will be said about con-
ditionals can be extended, mutatis mutandis, to counterfactuals. But for the sake 
of  simplicity we will not deal with such extension.1  
Moreover, the symbol > is not intended to characterize a semantically ho-
mogeneous class of  sentences. Conditionals may be used in more than one way, 
 
1 Iacona 2015 deals with counterfactuals. 
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and it is reasonable to expect that different criteria of  assessment are appropriate 
in different cases. In particular, we will take for granted that, although in some 
cases it is plausible to read p > q as p ⊃	q, that is, as a material conditional, in 
other cases it is not. From now on, the label ‘nonmaterial’ will be used generical-
ly for any conditional that at least prima facie is not tractable as a material con-
ditional. The literature on conditionals mostly focuses on nonmaterial condi-
tionals, and we will do the same.  
The next three sections outline three arguments that support the strict con-
ditional view. The three arguments hinge on three observations that will be 
called ‘facts’. This is not to say that they are truths written in stone. Perhaps 
there are no such truths. Or at least, the history of  the debate on conditionals 
shows that everything—or almost everything—can be questioned. So, none of 
the three arguments is intended to provide a conclusive reason to accept defini-
tion 1. Still, each of them deserves attention.  
 
2. First Argument  
The first argument hinges on the following observation:  
Fact 1:  It seems that in some cases one can assert p ∧	q but deny p > q.  
Although in many cases p ∧	q and p > q are both assertable, it seems that nothing 
in principle prevents us from thinking that one can accept p ∧	q but reject p > q. On 
the assumption that the rejection of  p > q justifies the acceptance of  ∼	(p > q), 
this is to say that there are cases in which p ∧	q and ∼	(p > q) are both assertable. 
Suppose that a coin is to be tossed twice and I bet that it will come up heads 
both times. Consider the following sentence, uttered just after the bet and before 
the first toss:  
(1)  If  at least one head will come up, I will win. 
In this case it seems correct to deny (1), and the appearance of correctness of 
this denial does not vanish if the coin comes up heads both times. Yet in that 
case it would be correct to say that the antecedent and the consequent of  (1) 
were both true.2  
Fact 1 raises a controversial issue. Some theorists of  conditionals think that ∼	(p > q) is inconsistent with p ∧	q because they believe in conjunction conditionali-
zation, that is, they believe what follows:  
(CC)  p ∧	q entails p > q. 
For example, Edgington says:  
 
Establishing that the antecedent and consequent are true is surely one incontro-
vertible way of  verifying a conditional.3  
 
Clearly, if p ∧	q entails p > q, then p ∧	q and ∼	(p > q) form an inconsistent set. 
However, CC cannot be invoked to dismiss fact 1 unless it is independently justi-
fied. Presumably, if  one takes fact 1 at face value, it is because one thinks that 
the assertability of  p > q requires that a certain relation obtains between p and q. 
 
2 The example is adapted from McDermott 2007. 
3 Edgington 1986: 24. 
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But if  one thinks so, then one may coherently deny CC, because p and q may be 
assertable even if  that relation does not obtain.  
One way to see that CC is dubious is to think that CC entails conjunction bi-
conditionalization, that is:  
(CB)  p ∧	q entails (p > q) ∧	(q > p).  
CB can be derived from CC by using the standard rules of conjunction introduction 
(CI) and conjunction elimination (CE):  
1 [1] p ∧	q A  
1 [2] p > q CC1 
1 [3] q CE1 
1 [4] p CE1 
1 [5] q ∧	p CI 3,4  
1 [6] q > p CC 5 
1 [7] (p > q) ∧	(q > p) CI 2,6 
But it is easy to see that CB has implausible instances. For example, the follow-
ing sentence seems to differ from (1) because it is clearly true:  
(2)  If  I will win, then at least one head will come up.  
However, according to CB there is no difference between (1) and (2), because (1) 
and (2) are both true, assuming that their constituents are true. Here is another 
example. I always use my bicycle to move around, and I cycle to work whenever 
I can. When it is a beautiful sunny day, of course, riding my bicycle is especially 
enjoyable. But also when it is cold, cloudy, or raining, I still prefer cycling than 
walking. I refrain from cycling only in case of  ice or snow storm. Now suppose 
that I am in my office, and that two colleagues of  mine, who have not looked 
out of  the window since their arrival, utter the following conditionals:  
(3)  If  it is a beautiful sunny day, then he came by bicycle  
(4)  If  he came by bicycle, then it is a beautiful sunny day  
In this situation it seems that one of them is right and the other is wrong. How-
ever, if  it is actually a beautiful sunny day and I came by bicycle, CB entails that 
(3) and (4) are both true.4  
The first argument rests on the assumption that fact 1 is a datum that de-
serves an explanation, so it is an argument for those who do not have a strong 
faith in CC. On this assumption, it turns out that the strict conditional view is 
more credible than other theories of conditionals, because it provides a better 
account of  fact 1.  
The strict conditional view explains fact 1 as follows: in some cases it seems 
that one can assert p ∧	q but deny p > q because in those cases the former is true but 
the latter is false. If  [p] = 1 in w and [q] = 1 in w but there is a w′ such that [p] = 1 in 
w′ and [q] = 0 in w′, [p ∧	q] = 1 in w but [p > q] = 0 in w. For example, in the case 
of  the coin one can say that (1) is false, because there are possible worlds in 
which at least one head comes up and I do not win.  
Now we will examine four well known alternatives to the strict conditional 
view, in order to show that none of them can explain fact 1. The first is the 
truth-functional view, the view that we find in every logic textbook:  
Definition 2:  [p > q] = 1 if and only if either [p] = 0 or [q] = 1.  
 
4 Butcher 1983: 89-90, takes the fact that CC entails CB as a reason against CC. 
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As long as assertability conditions are understood as truth conditions, the truth-
functional view is patently inadequate to explain fact 1. Since definition 2 entails 
that [p > q] = 0 if and only if [p] = 1 and [q] = 0, it turns out that one cannot as-
sert p ∧	q but deny p > q.  
Of  course, it is not essential to the truth-functional view that assertability 
conditions are understood as truth conditions. If one draws a distinction be-
tween truth and assertability, one can maintain definition 2 and claim that fact 1 
is to be explained in terms of  assertability rather than in terms of  truth. But then 
the question to be addressed concerns the account of the assertability conditions 
of  p > q rather than the truth-functional view itself.5 
The second alternative is the probabilistic view, which is based on Adams’s 
idea that the assertability of  p > q can be described in terms of  conditional prob-
ability. If P(p) is the probability of  p and P(q|p) is the probability of  q given p, 
then P(p > q) = P(q|p). So, p > q has an epistemic value defined as follows:  
Definition 3:  [p > q] = P(q|p).  
Here it is assumed that P(q|p) = P(p ∧	q)/P(p) for P(p) > 0. The values 1 and 0 
correspond to the maximum and the minimum degree of  belief. Although Ad-
ams does not provide a semantics for compound sentences with conditionals as 
parts, it is consistent with his idea to assume that definition 3 can be combined 
with the following principle:  
(N)  [∼	(p > q)] = 1 – [p > q].  
Definition 3 and (N) entail that [∼	(p > q)] = 1 – P(q|p). Since 1 – P(q|p) = 
P(∼	q|p), given that P(q|p) + P(∼ q|p) = 1, it follows that [∼	(p > q)] = [p > ∼	q].6 
The probabilistic view can be phrased in at least two ways. The simplest 
way—perhaps the closest to Adams’s proposal—is to say that a sentence is assert-
able when its value is greater than the value of  its negation, that is, when its prob-
ability is greater than 0.5. This version of the view squares ill with fact 1, as it en-
tails that p ∧	q and ∼	(p > q) cannot both be assertable. Suppose that (a) [∼	(p > q)] 
> 0.5 and (b) [p ∧	q] > 0.5. From (a) and (N) we get that 1 – [p > q] > 0.5. By 
definition 3, this means that 1 – P(q|p) > 0.5. Since P(∼	q|p) = 1 – P(q|p), we get 
that P(∼	q|p) > 0.5. It follows that P(q|p) ≤ 0.5. But P(q|p) = P(p ∧	q)/P(p), so 
P(p) = P(p ∧	q)/P(q|p). From this and (b) we get that P(p) > 1, which is absurd. 
The second way to phrase the probabilistic view is slightly more sophisti-
cated, in that it leaves room for contextual variation: p > q is assertable in a con-
text if  and only if  the conditional probability of  q given p is greater than a num-
ber n fixed by the context, where n > 0.5. This second version of  the view makes 
no significant advance as far as fact 1 is concerned. An inconsistency result can 
still be obtained by generalizing the reductio outlined above. Suppose that (a) 
[∼	(p > q)] > n and (b) [p ∧	q] > n. From (a) and (N) we get that 1 – [p > q] > n. 
By definition 3, this means that 1 – P(q|p) > n. Since P(∼	q|p) = 1 – P(q|p), we 
 
5 Lewis 1976, Jackson 1979, and others endorse definition 2 but claim that the assertabil-
ity of p > q can be measured in terms of  probability. So the discussion of  the second al-
ternative applies also to such proposals. 
6 Adams 1965 outlines the view. Adams explicitly claims that ∼	(p > q) is equivalent to 
p > ∼	q. In particular, Adams 1968: 271 presents a metalinguistic definition of  ∼	(p > q) 
as an abbreviation of  p > ∼	 q. Stalnaker 1970 also outlines a probabilistic semantics 
which combines definition 3 with (N). 
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get that P(∼	q|p) > n. It follows that P(q|p) ≤ n. But P(q|p) = P(p ∧	q)/P(p), so 
P(p) = P(p ∧	q)/P(q|p). From this and (b) we get that P(p) > 1, which is absurd.7 
The third alternative is the belief  revision view, which has been elaborated 
by Gärdenfors and others. On this view, conditionals are defined as acceptable 
relative to belief  states, understood as deductively closed sets of  sentences. Let f  
be a belief  revision function, that is, a function that, for a belief  state K and a 
sentence p, gives us a revised belief  state f (K, p). The acceptability conditions of  
p > q are given as follows:  
Definition 4:  [p > q] = 1 relative to K if  and only if  q ∈ f (K, p).  
Here 1 indicates acceptance, while 0 indicates non-acceptance or rejection: [p > q] 
= 0 relative to K if  and only if it is not the case that q ∈ (K, p). Since (N) holds, 
we get that [∼	(p > q)] = 1 relative to K if  and only if  [p > q] = 0 relative to K. To 
say that [p > q] = 1 relative to K is to say that there is a deductively closed set of 
sentences s(K) which includes K and p > q ∈ s(K). s(K) is understood as a support 
set, that is, as a set whose acceptability is grounded on the adoption of K. The 
distinction between K and s(K) matters only for conditionals, as it is assumed 
that membership in K means full belief  while the acceptance of  a conditional 
does not amount to full belief. For any p that does not contain >, if  p ∈ s(K) then 
p ∈ K. In this framework, a conditional can be defined as assertable for a speaker 
when it is acceptable relative to the speaker’s belief  state.8 
The belief  revision view does not explain fact 1. Given any two sentences p 
and q in which > does not occur, suppose that [p ∧	q] = 1 relative to K. Then (a) 
p ∈ K and (b) q ∈ K. On any reasonable understanding of  f, (a) entails that f (K, 
p) = K. From this and (b) we get that q ∈ f (K, p), so by definition 4 [p > q] = 1 
relative to K. This is to say that p ∧	q is inconsistent with ∼	(p > q). 
The fourth alternative is the possible worlds view advocated by Stalnaker. 
On this view, to ask whether p > q is true is to ask whether q is true in a possible 
world that makes p is true—a p-world—and otherwise differs minimally from 
the actual world. More precisely, the truth conditions of p > q relative to a possi-
ble world w are given in terms of  a selection function f that assigns a possible 
world to the pair formed by p and w:  
Definition 5:  [p > q] = 1 in w if and only if  [q] = 1 in f (p, w).  
Here f (p, w) is understood as the most similar world to w in which p is true. 
From definition 5 we get that p > q is true simpliciter if  and only if  it is true in 
the p-world that is most similar to the actual world.9  
The possible worlds view does not explain fact 1. Stalnaker assumes that 
the p-world that is most similar to w is w itself, so that f (p, w) = w when [p] = 1 
in w. On this assumption, known as strong centering, definition 5 entails that if  [p] 
= 1 in w, p > q] = 1 in w if and only if [q] = 1 in w. The selection function does 
substantive work only when the antecedent is false. Therefore, if  [p ∧	q] = 1 in w, 
then [p > q] = 1 in w. This is to say that p ∧	q is inconsistent with ∼	(p > q). 
The foregoing considerations show that, as far as the explanation of  fact 1 
is concerned, definition 1 is definitely better than definitions 2-5. This is not to 
 
7 I owe this argument to Vincenzo Crupi. 
8 An account along these lines was initially suggested in Gärdenfors 1978 and then devel-
oped in other works such as Gärdenfors 1988, Levi 1988, and Arlo-Costa 1955. 
9 This is the view defended in Stalnaker 1991. See also Davis 1979. 
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say that the strict conditional view is the only view that can explain fact 1. If  one 
adopts a variant of  the possible worlds view in which f (p, w) is a class of  p-
worlds rather than a single p-world, and the condition imposed on f is that, if  [p] 
= 1 in w, then w ∈ f (p, w)—the assumption known as weak centering—one does 
not get that p ∧	q is inconsistent with ∼	(p > q). But the point remains that the 
strict conditional view has a clear advantage over the four theories of  condition-
als considered.10  
 
3. Second Argument  
The second argument hinges on the following observation:  
Fact 2:  It seems that in some cases one can assert ∼	(p > q) but not p > ∼	q. 
To assert ∼	(p > q) is to deny that a certain relation holds between p and q. But 
this is not quite the same thing as to affirm that that relation holds between p 
and ∼	q. So it seems that, although in many cases ∼	(p > q) and p > ∼ q are both 
assertable, ∼	(p > q) does not entail p > ∼	q. Imagine that a detective and his as-
sistant investigate a murder in a mansion. The three suspects are the butler, the 
driver, and the gardener. The butler belongs to the house staff, while the driver 
and the gardener belong to the grounds staff. Once some clues are collected, it 
turns out that the butler has an airtight alibi. Then the assistant utters the follow-
ing sentence:  
(5)  If  a member of  the grounds staff  did it, then it was the driver. 
In this case it is reasonable for the detective to deny (5). But his denial of (5) 
does not imply that if  a member of the grounds staff did it, then it was the gar-
dener. Just as there is no reason to assert (5), there is no reason to assert such 
conditional.11  
Fact 2 raises another controversial issue. Some theorists of  conditionals 
hold that ∼	 (p > q) entails p > ∼ q simply because they believe that ∼	(p > q) 
means p > ∼ q. For example, Adams is quite explicit on this point:  
 
the ordinary meaning of  the denial ‘It is not the case that if  p then q’ is just to as-
sert ‘if  p then not q’.12  
 
However, fact 2 can hardly be dismissed by appealing to the meaning of  >, given 
that the whole debate on conditionals stems precisely from the fact that it is not 
obvious what > means. Presumably, if  one takes fact 2 at face value, it is because 
one thinks that the assertability of  a conditional requires that a certain relation 
obtains between its antecedent and its consequent, so that p > q and p > ∼	q can 
both be denied. This divergence has direct implications on the relation between 
excluded middle (EM) and conditional excluded middle (CEM). If one assumes that ∼	(p > q) entails p > ∼	q, one will expect that (p > q) ∨	∼	(p > q) entails (p > q) ∨	
 
10 This variant of the possible worlds view is in line with the account of counterfactuals 
sketched in Lewis 1973: 26-31, although that account is not intended to apply to condi-
tionals. Nolan 2003 defends a version of the possible worlds view that seems to go in this 
direction, as it takes fact 1 into account.  
11 This example is drawn from Gillies 2004: 589. 
12 Adams 1965: 181. 
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(p > ∼	q). Instead, if  one does not make that assumption, one will regard CEM 
as more dubious than EM. 
Fact 1 and fact 2 are related. There is a straightforward argument to the ef-
fect that, if  p ∧	q is consistent with ∼	(p > q), then ∼	(p > q) does not entail p > ∼	q. 
Let us call * the assumption that ∼	(p > q) entails p > ∼ q. If  * holds, then one 
can derive ∼∼	(p > q) from p ∧	q by CE, modus ponens (MP) and reductio ad absur-
dum (RAA):  
1 [1] p ∧	q A 
1 [2] p CE1 
1 [3] q CE1 
3 [4] ∼	(p > q) A 
3 [5] p > ∼	q *4 
1,3 [6] ∼ q MP 5,2 
1 [7] ∼∼	(p > q) RAA 4,3,6 
So it turns out that p ∧	q is inconsistent with ∼	(p > q) because it entails ∼∼	(p > q). 
The converse conditional, instead, is harder to justify: it is not obvious that, if ∼	
(p > q) does not entail p > ∼	q, then p ∧	q is consistent with ∼	(p > q). From the 
premise that p ∧	q is inconsistent with ∼	(p > q) one cannot draw the conclusion 
that ∼	 (p > q) entails p > ∼	 q. Certainly, that conclusion can be obtained by 
means of  conditional proof (CP):  
1 [1] ∼	(p > q) A 
2 [2] p A 
3 [3] q A 
3 [4] p > q CP 2,3 
1 [5] ∼	q RAA 3,4,1 
1 [6] p > ∼	q CP 2,5 
But not all theories of  conditionals validate CP, so here it cannot be taken for 
granted that CP holds for >. Therefore, facts 1 and 2 deserve separate considera-
tion: while there is a direct route from fact 1 to fact 2, there is no such route 
from fact 2 to fact 1.  
On the assumption that fact 2 is a datum that deserves an explanation, it 
turns out that the strict conditional view is more credible than other theories of 
conditionals. The strict conditional view explains fact 2 as follows: in some cases 
it seems that one can assert ∼	(p > q) but not p > ∼	q because in those cases the 
former is true but the latter is false. It may happen that [∼	(p > q)] = 1 in w, in 
that there is a w′ such that [p] = 1 in w′ and [q] = 0 in w′, but that [p > ∼	q] = 0 in 
w, in that there is a w′′ such that [p] = 1 in w′′ and [q] = 1 in w′′. For example, in 
the case of  the detective one can say that (5) is false, because there are possible 
worlds in which its antecedent is true and its consequent is false, but that the 
same goes for the conditional obtained from (5) by adding ‘not’ in the conse-
quent.  
The truth-functional view, instead, does not explain fact 2. According to 
definition 2, if  [∼	(p > q)] = 1, then [p] = 1 and [∼	q] = 1, so [p > ∼	q] = 1. This 
means that, as long as assertability conditions are understood as truth condi-
tions, p > ∼	q is assertable whenever ∼	(p > q) is assertable. Of  course, one may 
distinguish assertability from truth and claim that fact 2 is to be explained in 
terms of  assertability. But again, the explanatory problem then moves from the 
truth-functional view to the favoured account of  assertability.  
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The probabilistic view is also unable to explain fact 2. As it turns out from 
section 2, on this view [∼	(p > q)] = [p > ∼	q]. Therefore, ∼	(p > q) entails p > ∼	q. 
This holds no matter which of  the two versions of  the view one choses.  
Similar considerations hold for the possible worlds view. Suppose that [∼	(p 
> q)] = 1 in w. Then [p > q] = 0 in w, which means that [q] = 0 in f (p, w). It fol-
lows that [∼q] = 1 in f (p, w), so that [p > ∼	q] = 1 in w. This is to say that ∼	(p > 
q) entails p > ∼	q, contrary to fact 2.  
The belief  revision view does not have this problem. The assumption that 
[∼	(p > q)] = 1 relative to a belief state K does not entail that [p > ∼	q] = 1 rela-
tive to K. Since belief  sets are not required to be maximal, it may be the case 
that neither q nor ∼	q belong to f (K, p). By definition 4, this means that [p > q] = 
0 and [p > ∼	q] = 0 relative to K. So it may be the case that ∼	(p > q) is assertable 
while p > ∼	q is not.  
Thus, the strict conditional view is not the only view that can explain fact 2. 
Nonetheless, as far as fact 2 is concerned, definition 1 is better than definitions 
2, 3, and 5. Therefore, insofar as one thinks that fact 2 deserves an explanation, 
and is unwilling to take for granted that EM and CEM are equivalent, one will 
find that the strict conditional view has some virtue.  
 
4. Third Argument  
The third argument hinges on the following observation:  
Fact 3:  In some cases, ∼	(p > q) is paraphrased as ‘It is possible that p but not q’. 
This is simply a fact about ordinary language. The negation of  a conditional is 
often expressed by using modal vocabulary. For example, the detective could 
easily reply to his assistant “No, it might be the gardener”. Another example is 
the following. A philosophy teacher gives a lecture on theological matters and 
mentions benevolence among the properties traditionally ascribed to God. One 
of  the students is puzzled by the very concept of  divine benevolence, and utters 
the following sentence:  
(6) If  God exists, then the prayers of  evil men will be answered.  
In this case it is natural for the teacher to deny (6), and explain that the hypothe-
sis that God exists does not entail that the prayers of  evil men will be answered. 
In other words, the existence of God is consistent with the possibility that the 
prayers of  evil men will not be answered.13  
The issue that arises in connection with fact 3 is how can we make sense of 
the use of modal expressions in cases such as those just described. As is well 
known, modal expressions can be construed in more than one way. So it would 
be patently unreasonable to require that the word ‘possible’ in the modal para-
phrase of  ∼	(p > q) is read literally. What will be assumed here is rather that an 
account of  conditionals explains fact 3 as long as it explains the apparent cor-
rectness of the modal paraphrase of ∼	(p > q) in terms of  the notions it employs. 
As we shall see, this leaves room for a meaningful distinction between explain-
ing and not explaining fact 3.  
The strict conditional view provides the most obvious explanation of fact 3: ∼	(p > q) may be paraphrased as ‘It is possible that p but not q’ because it means 
 
13 This example is adapted from Stevenson 1970: 28. 
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precisely that it is possible that p but not q. So it makes perfect sense for the phi-
losophy teacher to deny (6) by affirming the possibility that its antecedent is true 
and its consequent is false.  
The truth-functional view, instead, does not explain fact 3. Definition 2 en-
tails that it is wrong to paraphrase ∼	(p > q) as ‘It is possible that p but not q’, for 
it makes ∼	(p > q) equivalent to p ∧	∼	q. The implausibility of  this equivalence is 
hardly deniable. For example, the philosophy teacher does not want to say that 
God actually exists.14  
The first version of  the probability view is also unable to explain fact 3. If 
assertability is defined in the first of the two ways suggested in section 2, then it 
is wrong to paraphrase ∼	(p > q) as ‘It is possible that p but not q’. Certainly, if  ∼	(p > q) is assertable, because [p > q] ≤ 0.5, then it is possible that p and not q. 
But even if ∼	(p > q) is not assertable, because [p > q] > 0.5, it is still possible that 
p and not q. Since ‘It is possible that p and not q’ is consistent both with ∼	(p > q) 
and with p > q, it cannot be equivalent to the former. The point is that a condi-
tional is often denied in virtue of  the mere possibility—no matter how proba-
ble—that its consequent does not hold on the supposition that its antecedent 
holds. Even if it were highly probable that the driver is the murderer, the detec-
tive could still deny (5) in virtue of  the possibility that the gardener is the mur-
derer. Similarly, when the philosophy teacher corrects the student, she clearly 
does not intend to say that, on the supposition that God exists, is unlikely that 
the prayers of evil men will be answered.  
The second version of the probability view improves the first in that it ex-
plains why p > q may be rejected even if  P(q|p) > 0.5. The case in which the de-
tective rejects (5) although it is highly probable that the driver is the murderer 
can be described as one in which the value of  (5) is still below the threshold 
fixed by the context: if P(q|p) = 0.8 but n = 0.9, p > q is not assertable. More 
drastically, the case in which the philosophy teacher rejects (6) can be described 
as one in which the threshold fixed by the context is 1, so no lower value will do. 
On the other hand, this is only half  of  the story. We have seen that the cases in 
which p > q can be denied are plausibly described as cases in which ∼	(p > q) can 
be asserted, and this is not what we get. Insofar as (N) holds, the second version 
implies that the non-assertability of p > q does not amount to the assertability of ∼	(p > q). For example, if  n = 0.9 and P(q|p) = 0.8, p > q is not assertable, but 
the same goes for ∼	(p > q), given that it gets 0.2.  
The belief  revision view is no better. Even assuming that possibilities are 
understood as belief  states, it is hard to see how definition 4 can account for the 
modal paraphrase of ∼	(p > q), given that the evaluation of p > q depends on 
what happens in a single belief state, f (K, p), so the same goes for ∼	(p > q). In 
other words, ‘It is possible that p but not q’ cannot be read as ‘There is a belief 
state in which p and not q’, for the view implies that ∼	(p > q) is assertable when 
the unique belief  state obtained from the revision of  our original state is such 
that p and not q.  
A similar problem affects the possible worlds view. As long as it is assumed 
that the evaluation of  p > q in w depends on whether q is true in a single possible 
world, f (p, w), what is said by uttering ∼	 (p > q) in w is that q is false in that 
 
14 Stevenson 1970 uses this example to show that the truth-functional view is unable to 
handle negated conditionals. 
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world. Therefore, ∼	(p > q) is not correctly paraphrased as ‘It is possible that p 
but not q’, for the latter sentence means that there is at least one possible world 
in which p and not q.  
Again, this is not to say that the strict conditional view is the only view that 
can explain fact 3. The problem that affects the possible worlds view disappears 
if  one adopts the variant considered in section 2, because in that case p > q turns 
out to be false when q is false in at least one of  the worlds that belong to f (p, w). 
Nonetheless, as far as fact 3 is concerned, definition 1 is better than definitions 
2-5. So the strict conditional view has an advantage over the four theories of 
conditionals considered.  
 
5. Invalid Argument Forms  
The arguments outlined in sections 2-4 provide some reasons for thinking that a 
conditional is true just in case it is impossible that its antecedent is true and its 
consequent is false. Although these arguments are not conclusive, given that facts 
1-3 might be questioned, they suggest that there may be something right in the 
strict conditional view. The rest of  the paper discusses two foreseeable objections 
to the strict conditional view, in order to show that they are not compelling.  
The first objection, which goes back to Adams, concerns the examples of 
apparently invalid inferences that are typically used to show that nonmaterial 
conditionals are nonmaterial. In his paper The Logic of  Conditionals, Adams of-
fers nine arguments as initial evidence against the truth-functional view:  
  A1  
(7) John will arrive at 10 
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾ 
(8) If  John does not arrive at 10, he will arrive at 11 
 
  A2 
(7) John will arrive at 10 
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾ 
(9) If  John misses his plane in New York, he will arrive at 10  
 
  A3  
(10) If  Brown wins the election, Smith will retire  
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾ 
(11) If  Smith dies before the election and Brown wins it, Smith will retire  
  
  A4  
(10) If  Brown wins the election, Smith will retire  
(12) If  Smith dies before the election, Brown will win it  
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾ 
(13) If  Smith dies before the election, he will retire  
  
  A5  
(10) If  Brown wins the election, Smith will retire  
(14) If  Brown wins the election, Smith will not retire  
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾ 
(15) Brown will not win  
 
  A6  
(16) Either Dr. A or Dr. B will attend the patient  
(17) Dr. B will not attend the patient  
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾ 
(18) If  Dr. A does not attend the patient, Dr. B will  
 
  A7  
(19) It is not the case that if  John passes history, he will graduate  
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾ 
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(20) John will pass history  
 
  A8  
(21) If  you throw switches S and T, it will start  
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾ 
(22) Either if  you throw switch S it will start or if you throw switch T it will start  
 
  A9  
(23) If  John will graduate only if he passes history, then he won’t graduate  
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾ 
(24) If  John passes history, he won’t graduate  
Adams’s point is that A1-A9 are apparently invalid. Since the truth-
functional view entails that A1-A9 instantiate valid argument forms, he takes 
this to show that the truth-functional view is seriously limited. A further claim 
he makes, which concerns us here, is that A1-A9 speak against the strict condi-
tional view as well. When he comments on A4, which instantiates the principle 
of  hypothetical syllogism, he says:  
 
A closely related principle is taken as a postulate in C.I. Lewis’ theory of  strict 
implication. It is unlikely, therefore, that fallacies of  the kind given here can be 
entirely avoided by going over to formal analysis in terms of  strict implication or 
related systems.15  
 
Here Adams seems to claim that if  A4 were formalized in accordance with the 
strict conditional view, it would be described as an instance of a valid argument 
form, that is:  
  F4  
 (p ⊃ q) 
 (r ⊃ p) 
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾ 
 (r ⊃ q)  
So the problem of explaining its apparent invalidity would still be there. Similar 
considerations might be applied to some of the other examples provided by Ad-
ams. In particular, it might be contended that, if A3 and A5 were formalized in 
accordance with the strict conditional view, they would be described as instances 
of  valid argument forms:  
  F3  
 (p ⊃ q)  
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾ 
 ((p ∧ r) ⊃ q)  
  F5  
 (p ⊃ q)  
 (p ⊃	∼ q)  
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾ ∼	p  
More generally, the objection may be phrased as follows: some arguments in-
volving nonmaterial conditionals are apparently invalid, but according to the 
strict conditional view they instantiate valid argument forms; so there is some-
thing wrong with the strict conditional view.  
The flaw of  this objection lies in the assumption that A3-A5 instantiate val-
id argument forms according to the strict conditional view. Definition 1 does not 
 
15 Adams 1965: 168-69. 
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fix a unique method of formalization, that is, it does not determine a unique 
way to assign formulas of  a modal language to conditionals. So it is not obvious 
that A3-A5 are to be formalized in the way suggested by Adams. In particular, 
as we shall see, it is consistent with the strict conditional view to claim that A3-
A5 instantiate invalid argument forms that differ from F3-F5.  
Let us start from the very notion of adequate formalization. One way to 
understand adequate formalization, which is consistent with the strict condi-
tional view, is to assume that a formula adequately formalizes a sentence if and 
only if  it provides a logically perspicuous representation of  what is said by utter-
ing the sentence. Since an adequate formalization of a sentence shows its logical 
form, this is to assume that sentences have logical form in virtue of  the content 
they express. So the implied notion of logical form significantly differs from a 
syntactically oriented notion such as that adopted, among others, by Lycan, Gil-
lies, and Kratzer. Even though a syntactically oriented notion of logical form is 
perfectly respectable in that it suits certain theoretical purposes, its suitability for 
those purposes does not prevent other notions of logical form from being equal-
ly respectable for other reasons. All that is needed here is that there is at least 
one coherent notion of logical form according to which logical form depends on 
what is said.16  
On this understanding of  adequate formalization, there are essentially two 
ways to formalize conditionals in accordance with definition 1, depending on 
how contextual restrictions on possibility are expressed at the level of logical 
form. One option is to incorporate such restrictions in the antecedent: p > q as 
uttered in a context c may be represented as  (pc ⊃	q), where pc is a formula that 
differs from p in that it expresses a stricter condition fixed by c. That is, pc may 
be read as ‘p and things are like in the actual world according to c’. The other 
option is to incorporate such restrictions in the necessity operator: p > q as ut-
tered in c may be represented as  c (p ⊃	 q), where  c expresses quantification 
over a restricted set of  worlds. That is,  c is to be read as ‘in every world that is 
similar to the actual world relative to c’. This second option is often associated 
with the idea that contexts are sets of  worlds that vary as a function of the ante-
cedent, so that any difference in the antecedent determines a difference in the in-
tended context.17 
No matter which of  these two options one chooses, one can deny that A3-
A5 instantiate F3-F5. Consider the first option. According to this option, the 
logical form of  p > q as uttered in c is  (r ⊃ q), where r stands for ‘p and things 
are relevantly like in the actual world’ as understood in c. This entails that A3-
A5 are adequately formalized as follows:  
  F3′  
 (p ⊃ q)  
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾ 
 (r ⊃ q)  
 
16 Lycan 2001, Gillies 2009, Kratzer 2012. Iacona 2018 distinguishes a notion of  logical 
form based on content from a syntactically oriented notion of logical form, and illustrates 
some significant implications of the distinction 
17 In the case of counterfactuals, the first option has been developed in different ways in 
in Åqvist 1973 and in Iacona 2015, while the second has been considered in various 
works, such as Lowe 1990. The idea that contexts vary as a function of  the antecedent 
has been developed in Von Fintel 2001, Gillies 2007, Warmbrod 1981, and Lowe 1995. 
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  F4′  
 (p ⊃ q) 
 (r ⊃ s) 
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾ 
 (r ⊃ q)  
  F5′  
 (p ⊃ q)  
 (p ⊃	∼ q)  
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾ ∼	r  
A3 is adequately formalized as F3′, rather than as F3, because the real anteced-
ent of  (10) is ‘Brown wins the elections and things are relevantly like in the actu-
al world’, so the real antecedent of  (11) is not a conjunction that includes the re-
al antecedent of  (10) as a conjunct. The real antecedent of  (11) is rather ‘Smith 
dies before the election, Brown wins it, and things are relevantly like in the actu-
al world’. Similar considerations hold for A4 and A5. On the assumption that 
the logical form of (10)-(15) is represented in the way suggested, it turns out that 
A4 and A5 are adequately formalized as F4′ and F5′ rather than as F4 and F5. 
Since F3′-F5′ are invalid argument forms, the apparent invalidity of A3-A5 
causes no trouble.  
Now consider the second option. According to this option, the logical form 
of  p > q as uttered in c is  c (p ⊃	q), where  c is to be read as ‘in every world that 
is similar to the actual world relative to c’. Assuming that different antecedents 
require different contexts, A3 and A4 are adequately formalized as follows:  
  F3′′  
 c (p ⊃ q)  
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾ 
 c′ ((p ∧ r) ⊃ q)  
  F4′′  
 c (p ⊃ q)  
 c′ (r ⊃ p)  
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾ 
 c′ (r ⊃ q)  
The case of  A5 is slightly different. In this case the assumption that different an-
tecedents require different context plays no role, because (10) and (14) have the 
same antecedent. Nonetheless, it is plausible to postulate a context shift to ex-
plain how (10) and (14) can both be true in spite of the fact that they have con-
tradictory consequents. So A5 is adequately formalized as follows:  
  F5′′  
 c (p ⊃ q)  
 c′ (p ⊃	∼ q)  
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾ ∼	p  
Since F3′′-F5′′ involve different operators, they are invalid argument forms. Or at 
least, this follows from the reasonable assumption that, in a modal language with 
multiple operators, the valid counterparts of  F3-F5 require that the operator is 
fixed. Again, we get that the apparent invalidity of A3-A5 causes no trouble.  
 
6. Material Conditionals  
The second objection concerns material conditionals. As has been explained in 
section 1, there are cases in which conditionals are prima facie tractable as material 
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conditionals, that is, cases in which it is plausible to read p > q as p ⊃	q. Therefore, 
it might be contended that the strict conditional view is no better than the truth-
functional view as far as explanatory power is concerned: each of  the two views 
can account at most for a limited range of  cases.  
Against this objection it might be argued that the strict conditional view can 
handle material conditionals. Let us consider an example in which it is plausible 
to read p > q as p ⊃	q. Suppose that you submit a paper to a journal that an-
nounced a special issue on your favourite topic. After six months, you write an 
email to the editor of  the journal to ask about the status of  your submission, and 
you receive the following reply:  
(25) Your paper was considered, if submitted before the deadline.  
In this case it seems that the assessment of  (25) depends on the way things actu-
ally are. If  one knows whether your paper was actually submitted before the 
deadline and whether it was actually considered, one is in a position to say 
whether the assertion made by the editor is true or false.  
One way to see the difference between this case and the other cases consid-
ered so far is to realize that it would be wrong to explain the truth or falsity of 
(25) in terms of  quantification over a set of  worlds that includes non-actual 
worlds relevantly similar to the actual world. Suppose that the editor of  the 
journal is very unreliable and normally ignores most submissions, but that your 
submission was considered for purely accidental reasons. On any reasonable 
understanding of  the relevance condition, the set of relevantly similar worlds in-
cludes worlds in which the paper was submitted but not considered, so (25) 
would turn out false. Yet it is plausible to say that (25) is accidentally true.18  
The strict conditional view leaves room for cases of this kind, because it 
does not require that the domain of  quantification includes worlds other than 
the actual world. It is consistent with definition 1 to say that there are cases in 
which the only relevant w′ is w itself. In other terms, the cases in which it is 
plausible to read p > q as p ⊃	q are cases in which ‘Necessarily, if  p and things 
are relevantly like in the actual world, then q’ is understood as ‘Necessarily, if  p 
and things are exactly like in the actual world, then q’. So the case of  (25) can be 
described as one in which the only relevant world is the actual world. More gen-
erally, material conditionals can be treated as a limiting case in which the rele-
vant set of  possible worlds contains the actual world as its only member.  
Note that conditionals about the future often behave as material condition-
als. Consider the following:  
(26) If  I open this box, I will find chocolates  
(27) If  tomorrow is sunny, I will go to the beach.  
In normal circumstances we take for granted that whether (26) is true or false 
depends on what is actually inside the box. The existence of a possible world in 
which the box is empty does not suffice to falsify (26). Similarly, in normal cir-
cumstances we take for granted that whether (27) is true or false depends on 
what will actually happen tomorrow. The existence of a possible world in which 
tomorrow is sunny but I stay at home does not suffice to falsify (27).  
 
18 Here it is taken for granted that the truth of  the antecedent and the consequent of  (25) 
does not suffice for the truth of  (25) if  a quantification on possible worlds is involved. But 
this is not essential to the point, as similar examples may be provided in which the ante-
cedent is false, as it is shown by Kratzer manuscript, section 2. 
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This is not to say that the account of  material conditionals offered by the 
strict conditional view is better than the account of  material conditionals offered 
by the truth-functional view. At most, the former is as good as the latter. The 
point here is about explanatory power. While the truth-functional view works 
for material conditionals but has little to say about nonmaterial conditionals, the 
strict conditional view applies both to non-material conditionals—at least in 
some cases—and to material conditionals. Material conditionals can be treated 
as special cases of strict conditionals, whereas strict conditionals cannot be 
treated as special cases of material conditionals. In this respect the strict condi-
tional view is definitely better than the truth-functional view.  
 
7. Conclusion  
Let us conclude with some general remarks about the logical significance of the 
strict conditional view. What has been said so far suggests that, at least in a con-
siderably wide class of  cases, conditionals are adequately formalized as strict 
conditionals. Therefore, as long as we restrict consideration to such cases, the 
logical properties of  conditionals can be elucidated by employing the resources 
of  modal propositional logic.  
This is not to say that the strict conditional view works for every case. Even 
if  it is granted that some nonmaterial conditionals are adequately formalized as 
strict conditionals, and that all material conditionals are handled in the way ex-
plained, the question remains of  whether these two categories of  conditionals 
are jointly exhaustive. What has been said so far is consistent with the possibility 
that some nonmaterial conditionals are not amenable to the formal treatment 
suggested.  
Nonetheless, the strict conditional view poses an interesting challenge. 
Most theorists of  conditionals tend to think that conditionals do not conform to 
classical logic: they claim that conditionals are not evaluable as true or false, that 
the arguments in which they occur are not appropriately assessed in terms of 
classical validity, that they violate classical rules of  inferences, and so on. Insofar 
as the strict conditional view works, no such revisionary conclusion can be 
drawn. Even though propositional logic may not be enough in some cases, all 
we need to do is to go from propositional modal logic to its most familiar exten-





Adams, E.W. 1965, “The Logic of  Conditionals”, Inquiry, 8, 166-97.  
Adams, E.W. 1968, “Probability and the Logic of  Conditionals”, in Suppes, P. and J. 
Hintikka (eds.), Aspects of  Inductive Logic, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 265-316.  
Åqvist, L. 1973, “Modal Logic with Subjunctive Conditionals and Dispositional 
Predicates”, Journal of  Philosophical Logic, 2, 1-76.  
 
19 Previous versions of this paper were given as talks in Matera (2015), Leeds (2016), and 
Munich (2016). I learned much from the discussions with those who attended, before and 
after the talks. I would like to express my special gratitude in this connection to Vincenzo 
Crupi, John Divers, Kevin Mulligan, Gil Sagi, Robbie Williams, and Tim Williamson. I am 
also extremely grateful to two anonymous referees for their written comments on the text. 
Andrea Iacona 192 
Arlo-Costa, H. 1955, “Epistemic Conditionals, Snakes and Stars”, in Crocco, G., L. 
Farinas del Cerro and A. Herzig (eds.), Conditionals. From Philosophy to Computer 
Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 193-239. 
Butcher, D. 1983, “An incompatible pair of  subjunctive conditional modal axioms”, 
Philosophical Studies, 44: 71-110.  
Davis, W. 1979, “Indicative and Subjunctive Conditionals”, Philosophical Review, 88, 
544-64. 
Edgington, D. 1986, “Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions?”, Critica, 18, 3-30.   
Gärdenfors, P. 1978, “Conditionals and Changes of  Belief”, in Niiniluoto, I. and R. 
Tuomela (eds.), The Logic and Epistemology of  Scientific Change, Acta Philosophica 
Fennica, 30, 381-404. 
Gärdenfors, P. 1988, Knowledge in Flux, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Gillies, A.S. 2004, “Epistemic Conditionals and Conditional Epistemics”, Noûs, 38, 
585-616. 
Gillies, A.S. 2007, “Counterfactual Scorekeeping”, Linguistics and Philosophy, 30, 
329-60.  
Gillies, A.S. 2009, “On Truth-Conditions for If  (but Not Quite Only If)”, Philosophi-
cal Review, 118, 325-49.  
Iacona, A. 2015, “Counterfactuals as Strict Conditionals”, Disputatio, 41, 165-91.  
Iacona, A. 2018, Logical Form, Cham: Springer.  
Jackson, F. 1979, “On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals”, in Jackson, F. (ed.), 
Conditionals, Vol. 88, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987, 111-35.  
Kratzer, A. 2012, Modals and Conditionals, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Kratzer, A. manuscript, “Chasing Hook: Quantified Indicative Conditionals”. 
Levi, I. 1988, “Iteration of  Conditionals and the Ramsey Test”, Synthese, 76, 49-81.  
Lewis, D. 1973, Counterfactuals, Oxford: Blackwell.  
Lewis, D. 1976, “Probability of  Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities”, Philo-
sophical Review, 85, 297-315.  
Lowe, E.J. 1990, “Conditionals, Context, and Transitivity”, Analysis, 50, 80-87.  
Lowe, E.J. 1995, “The Truth about Counterfactuals”, Philosophical Quarterly, 45, 41-59.  
Lycan, W.G. 2001, Real Conditionals, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
McDermott, M. 2007, “True Antecedents”, Acta Analytica, 22, 333-35. 
Nolan, D. 2003, “Defending a Possible-Worlds Account of  Indicative Conditionals”, 
Philosophical Studies, 116, 215-69.  
Stalnaker, R.C. 1970, “Probability and Conditionals”, Philosophy of  Science, 37, 64-80.  
Stalnaker, R. 1991, “A Theory of  Conditionals”, in Jackson, F. (ed.), Conditionals, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 28-45.  
Stevenson, C.L. 1970, “If-iculties”, Philosophy of  Science, 37, 27-49.  
von Fintel, K. 2001, “Counterfactuals in a Dynamic Context”, in Kenstowicz, M. 
(ed.), Ken Hale: A Life in Language, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 123-52.  
Warmbrod, K. 1981, “Counterfactuals and Substitution of  Equivalent Antecedents”, 
Journal of  Philosophical Logic, 10, 267-89. 
